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Iiams, 319 Md. at 494,573 A.2d at 814
(citingSard, 281 Md. at 439,379 A.2d at
1014).
Next, the court looked at each applicable health statute in detail, noting
their procedural and substantive due
process requirements. Williams argued
that § 10-708 did not provide for proper
notice, the right to attend the meeting,
the right to a written decision, or the
right to an appeal. Id. at 492,573 A.2d at

813.

In answering in the affirmative, the
Court held that the state had a rational
basis for administering the drugs to the
inmates, regardless of their displeasure.
Williams, 319 Md. at 499, 573 A.2d at
816.
It found that, substantively, the state's
administrative policy was a "rational
means of furthering the state's legitimate objectives of administering drugs
for treatment purposes under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist." Id. at
502, 573 A.2d at 817 (citing Harper,
110 S. Ct. at 1042). Procedurally, the
Court stated that nothing in the Constitution prohibited the state from permitting medical personnel to make that
decision "under fair procedural mechanisms." Id. at 503, 573 A.2d at 818 (citing Harper, 110 S. Ct. at 1042).
Although the court of appeals noted
that Williams was not a prisoner in a
penal institution, as was the patient in
Harper, it stated that Harper set forth
procedural due process guidelines for
determining whether Williams' constitutional rights were violated. Id., at 508,
573 A.2d at 820. The court concluded
that because § 10-708 did not provide
Williams with notice of the final review
proceeding, or the ability to present
evidence, or the ability to cross examine
witnesses, it did not afford the requisite
procedural due process protections to
which Williams was entitled. Id. at 50910,573 A.2d at 821.
The court ruled, therefore, that it was
error to enter summary judgment against
Williams, and it was error to deny Williams' motion for partial summary judgment. Consequently, the court held that
the common law rule, as set forth in
Sard v. Hardy, requiring a patient's consent before the administration of such
drugs, applied in William's case. Id. at
510,573 A.2d at 821 (citingSard, 281
Md. at 439,379 A.2d at 1014).
The court of appeals concluded that
additional procedural due process protections were owed to Williams even
though the Supreme Court, in Harper,
specifically did not require such protections. In so holding, it is obvious that the
Maryland court wished to give involuntarily committed individuals additional guarantees of due process protection above and beyond what the Supreme
Court required.

Eanes v. State: RESTRICTIONS ON
THE VOLUME LEVEL OF
PROTECTED SPEECH HELD
CONSTITUTIONAL
In Eanes v. State, 318 Md. 436, 569
A.2d 604 (1990), the Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that a statute limiting
the volume level of protected speech
does not violate the first amendment to
the United States Constitution
While speaking against abortion in
front of the Hagerstown Reproductive
Clinic ("Clinic"), Jerry Wayne Eanes
("Eanes") made no threat of violence,
no effort to physically restrain those
entering the Clinic, and made no attempt
to block access to the Clinic. Eanes, 318
Md. at 441, 569 A.2d at 606. Additionally, Eanes did not use obsenity, profanity or attempt to incite violence. Eanes
spoke without artificial amplification,
yet, was alleged to have spoken so loudly
that he was heard above the noise
generated by traffic. Throughout the
day, local residents and people employed
in the vicinity made several complaints
to the local police regarding the loudness of Eanes' speech. Id.
After the police department had received numerous complaints concerning the volume level of the demonstrator, the police warned Eanes to lower
his voice. Eanes ignored the warning
and was arrested for disturbing the
peace in violation of Md. Ann. Code art.
27, § 121 (1989). Section 121 makes it
unlawful for anyone to "wilfully disturb
any neighborhood in [any Maryland]
city, town or county by loud and unseemly noises." Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
121 (1989). Eanes was found guilty in
the District Court of Maryland for Washington County. Eanes, 318 Md. at 442,
569 A.2d at 607.
On appeal, Eanes, citing Diebl v. State,
294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982), cert.
denied, 460 US. 1098 (1983), contended that only speech not protected
by the first amendment was subject to a
statutory prohibition against "loud and
unseemly noises." Eanes, 318 Md. at
443, 569 A.2d at 607. The court, disagreed with Eanes' interpretation, and
explained that the prohibition against
"loud and unseemly noises" in Diehl
sought to regulate objectionable content of speech. Whereas in Eanes, the
court pointed out, it was the volume
level which was objectionable, not the

After addressing the applicable health
statutes, the court focused upon the
Supreme Court cases of Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 US. 307 (1982) and Washington v. Hatper, 11 0 S. Ct. 1028 ( 1990).
The court used these cases to support
the rationale that due process considerations could be satisfied if professional
judgment was used to override the patient's objections. Williams, 319 Md. at
495, 573 A.2d at 813.
Although Youngberg did not deal
with forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs, the case did address what
rights a person involuntarily committed
to a state institution possessed under
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court in Youngberg
concluded that such an individual could
be restrained to the extent deemed
necesary by the medical profession. Williams, 310 Md. at 497, 573 A.2d at 814
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 324). In
reaching this decision, the Supreme
Court stated "it was necessary to balance the liberty of the individual and the
demands of an organized society." Id. at
495, 573 A.2d at 814, (citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 320). Specifically, the
court reasoned that although the committed individual possessed certain
rights, the state also had legitimate reasons for restraining a committed individual's liberty. Id.
Additionally, the Supreme Court
stated that deference should be given to
the decisions made by the medical staff
of an institution in that judges and juries
were not better qualified than medical
professionals in determining which procedures best protect an individual's liberty interests. Id. at 496,573 A.2d 814
(citing Youngberg, 457 US. at 322-23).
Unlike Youngberg, the recently decided case of Harper deals specifically
with whether a state had the right to
forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs
- Kathleen Dunivin Scbmitt
to an involuntarily committed prisoner.
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content of the speech. [d. at 444, 569
A.2d at 607-08.
The court began its analysis by distinguishing between content-neutral and
content-based statutes. The court noted
that to pass constitutional muster, content-based restrictions in a public forum
must serve a compelling state interest
and be narrowly drawn to achieve that
end. [d. at 447, 569 A.2d at 609 (citing
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educationers' Ass'n, 460 u.s. 37,45 (1983)).
Alternatively, content-neutral regulations of time, place and manner must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant
government [al] interest, and leave open
ample alternative channels of communication." [d. at 447-48,569 A.2d at 609
(quoting Frisby v. Shultz, 487 u.s. 474,
481 (1988».
The court held that Section 121 was a
content-neutral regulation of manner of
expression that served to limit, under
proper circumstances, loudness of delivery. To hold otherwise, the court
noted, would improperly render the statute invalid. [d. at 448,569 A.2d at 610
(citing City of College Park v. Cotter,
309 Md 573, 589, 525A2d 1059,1067
(1987». The court explained that statutes are presumed to be constitutional,
such that when one interpretation would
render the statute unconstitutional and
another would render the statute valid,
the statute must be interpreted in such a
manner to be constitutional. [d
The court next examined the type of
forum at issue. [d. at 446, 569 A.2d at
609. Eanes spoke on the street and
sidewalk. The court concluded that
streets and sidewalks are traditional
public forums where the right to free
speech cannot be broadly and absolutelydenied.[d. at 447, 569A.2dat609
( citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318
(1988); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
515 (1976)).
Given the context of a public forum,
the court went on to consider the three
requirements of a constitutionally permissible content-neutral statute. First,
there must exist a substantial governmental interest. Second, the statute must
be narrowly tailored. Finally, ample alternative channels of communication
must be left open. [d. at 447-48, 569
A.2d at 609.
The court began by determining
whether a substantial governmental interest existed. Following United States
44 - The Law Forurn/21.1

Supreme Court decisions, the court concluded that "government ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens
from unwelcome noise." [d at 449, 569
A.2d at 610 (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796
( 1989». This governmental interest in
the protection of the unwilling listener
from undue noise intrusion in the privacy of ones' home has been extended
by the Supreme Court to include the
protection of the unwilling listener in a
publicforum.[d. at450, 569A.2dat61O
(citing Frisby, 487 u.s. at 484; Ward,
491 U.S. at 791). The extension of protection afforded to the unwilling listener in a public forum, the court explained, involved the notion of a "captive
audience" which is defined as the "unwilling listener or viewer who cannot
readily escape from the undesired communication, or whose own rights are
such that he or she should not be required to do so." [d. at 4 51, 569 A.2d at
611. The Eanes court, therefore, held
that Section 121, affording protection to
a captive audience from "unreasonably
loud and disruptive communications
emanating from the street," was a content-neutral restriction which served a
substantial governmental interest. [d. at
453,569 A.2d at 612.
The narrowly tailored statutory requirement, the court determined, was
satisfied "so long as the ... regulation
promotes a substantial government[al]
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." [d. at
454, 569 A.2d at 613 (quoting United
States v. Albertini, 472 u.s. 675, 689
( 1985». The court concluded that the
protection of the captive audience, those
persons employed and living in the vicinity of the Clinic, would be achieved less
effectively absent the volume level regulation. [d. at 484-55,569 A.2d at 613.
The court considered the availability
of alternative channels of communication which included speaking at a lower
volume, individual contact, and distribution of literature or the carrying of a
sign. The court deemed all of these
alternatives to be less instrusive on
unwilling listeners. Therefore, the court
held that Section 121 does not inhibit
the use of various alternative channels of
communication. [d. at 456, 569 A.2d at
613-14.
Eanes also alleged on appeal that Section 121 was void for vagueness. The

court noted that a provision was vague if
it is not sufficiently explicit to inform
persons what conduct will render them
liable to its penalties. [d. at 458-59, 569
A.2d at 615 (citing Bowers v. State, 283
Md. 115, 120, 389 A2d 341, 345
(1978)). The court referred to this as
the fair notice principle which "is
grounded on the assumption that one
should be free to choose between lawful
and unlawful conduct." Id. at 459, 569
A.2dat615 (quotingBowers, 283 Md at
121, 389 A.2d at 345). The court rejected Eanes' contention that there
should be specific decible guidelines
and went on to add that a "[s]tatute
which is both general enough to take
into account a variety of human conduct
and sufficiently specific to provide fair
warning that certain kinds of conduct
are prohibited" is not vague simply
because it involves an imprecise normativestandard.ld. at 459, 569A.2dat615
(quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 u.s.
104,110 (1972».
Alternatively, the Court noted that a
statute may be void if it allows for irrational and selective enforcement. Id. at
464, 569 A2d at 617 (citing Bowers,
283 Md at 122, 389 A 2d at 346). However, a statute is not vague merely because it allows the exercise of discretion
on behalf of law and judicial enforcement officials. Id The Court found,
therefore, that Section 121 does not
permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.ld at 464, 569 A.2d at 618.
The court concluded that prior warning by police authority is required in
order that a speaker is made aware that
his speech is unlawfully disruptive. Id. at
463, 569 A2d at 617. Eanes had been
asked by residents and persons in the
surrounding business community to reduce his volume of speech and the local
police department had warned Eanes
that his loudness was disrupting the
peace. Consequently, the court found
that Eanes was sufficiently warned and
was aware that further communication
at the offensive volume level would
result in prosecution. Id. at 466-67, 569
A.2d at 619. Therefore, the court held
that Section 121 was constitutional on
its face and as applied. Id. at 466-67, 569
A.2d at 619-20.
The court then addressed Eanes' contention that Section 121 was overboard
because it had a chilling effect on the
freedom of speech. Id at 464, 569 A.2d

at 618 (citing City of Los Angeles v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US. 789,
796-98 ( 1.984)). A statute should not be
struck down for being overbroad, "unless there is a realistic danger that the
statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court."
[d. at 465, 569 A2d at 618 (quoting
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 us. at 801).
Section 121 contains applicable enforcement standards, and does not reach
beyond conduct which can be regulated
consistent with the first amendment.
The court concluded, therefore, that
Section 121 was not overbroad. [d.
Judge Eldridge argued vehemently
against state restrictions on the volume
level of protected speech in his dissent.
Judge Eldridge was of the opinion that
Diehl stood for the proposition that the
phrase "loud and unseemly" could only
serve to limit speech which "presented
a clear and present danger of violence,
or [speech] not intended as communications but merely as a guise to disturb
other persons." [d at 470, 569 A2d at
620 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). He found
Section 121 unconstitutional as applied
because the limitations on speech made
the delivery ofspeech a crime.[d at 473,
569 A.2d at 622 (Eldridge,]., dissenting). Judge Eldridge went on to note
that" [a)nnoyance at ideas can be cloaked
in annoyance at sound" [d. at 475,569
A.2d at 623 (quoting Saia v. New York,
334 us. 558,562 (1948)) (Eldridge,].,
dissenting). He then criticized the
majority which found that "[s]ound is
one of the most intrusive means of
communication," and pointed out that
"sound, in the form of the spoken word,
is the most basic thing protected by the
First Amendment." [d. at 476, 569 A.2d
at 624 (Eldridge,]., dissenting).
Judge Eldridge found the court's requirement of prior warning an illusory,
ineffective protection as any time
government authorities desire to suppress first amendment activity, they
could easily find complainants to give
prior warnings. [d. at 490, 569 A2d at
630 (Eldridge, ]., dissenting). He believed that Eanes' speech was within his
constitutional guarantees and concluded
his dissent expressing his fear for those
persons who speak on controversial
topics. [d. at 500, 569 A.2d at 635-36.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
"balanc[ed] one's right to express him-

finding that the initial encounter was
not a seizure. Jones was convicted. [d
The court of special appeals affirmed
the conviction, finding the initial encounter was a "mere accosting", and not
a seizure under the fourth amendment.
[d. at 282, 572 A.2d at 171. The court
determined that the stop was a "mere
accosting" because there was no show
of force or weapons used to effectuate
the stop; and, therefore, the trial court
properly denied the motion to suppress.
[d. The court of appeals granted
- Kimberly A. Doyle
certiorari.
The issue on appeal was whether the
Jones v. State: THE FOURTH
stop was a legal seizure under the fourth
AMENDMENT IS VIOLATED
amendment. Jones argued that an illegal
WHEN POliCE STOP A
stop and seizure occurred when the
BICYCliST WITHOUT
police ordered the stop of his bicycle
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE
without reasonable articulable suspicion.
SUSPICION
[d. The state posited two competing
In Jones v. State, 319 Md. 279,572
arguments. Either there was no error
A2d 169 (1990), the Court of Appeals
by the trial judge and therefore, the stop
of Maryland, held that a police stop of a
was consensual rather than custodial in
bicyclist for investigatory purposes based
nature and was not a seizure. Alternaon a hunch, without a reasonable articutively, if the stop was a seizure, there was
lable suspicion justifying the stop, viosufficient articulable suspicion to justify
lated the fourth amendment. The court
the stop. [d.
reasoned that a seizure occurred when
The court began its analysis by stating
the officer commanded the bicyclist to
the general rule that a police stop is a
stop, thus affording fourth amendment
seizure when a reasonable person would
protection.
feel that his freedom to walk away was
Carl Lee J ones was riding his bicycle
restrained. [d. at 282, (citing Terry v.
at 3:20 a.m. carrying a grocery bag hangOhio, 392 US. 1 (1968)). Additionally,
ing from the handlebars and, apparently,
the court, in distinguishing a seizure
drycleaning bags across his shoulders
from a "mere accosting" held that a
and travelled from the general direction
seizure occurs when an individual to
of a drycleaning store. The area where
whom questions are posed does not feel
J ones was riding had been the scene of
free to disregard the questions and walk
several recent burglaries. Officer Brown
away. [d. at 283, 572 A.2d 171 (citing
spotted Jones and in language to the
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 us. 544
effect of "hey, could you come here,"
( 1980)). Adopting a totality of the circommanded him to stop. Once stopped,
cumstances approach to determine what
the officer noticed a bulge in Jones'
constitutes a seizure, the court stated
jacket pocket that appeared to be a
that one or all of the following factors
handgun. A pat down search yielded a
may persuade a trial court that a seizure
.25 caliber pistol. A subsequent search
occurred: (1) threatening presence of
of the grocery bag yielded various quanseveral officers; (2) show or use of a
tities of cocaine, marijuana, and other
weapon; (3) physical contact by the
p_araphemalia Jones was arrested and
officer; or ( 4) authoritative tone or lancharged with possession and intent to
guage by the officer indicating an order
distribute cocaine, possession of marirather than a request. [d.
juana, and unlawful wearing and transApplying the Mendenhall factors, the
porting of a handgun.
court noted in Florida v. Royer, 460 u.s.
491 (1983), that merely approaching an
Prior to trial, Jones made a motion to
individual and asking questions constisuppress the evidence on the ground
that the search and seizure was illegal
tuted a voluntary stop and was not a
seizure unless the person approached
because of the illegal stop. Jones, 319
Md. at 280, 572 A.2d at 170. The trial
was detained. Rejecting the use of a
court denied his motion based on its
bright line test, the court instead posited
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 21.1/TheLawForum-45
self and other's right to be free from
disruption." [d. at 467,569 A.2d at 619.
The Court concluded that Section 121 is
content-neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial governmental interest and leaves open ample alternative
channels of communication. Eanes was
given fair notice that the volume level of
his speech would be subject to prosecution ifit was not lowered. Therefore, the
statute did not violate Eanes' right to
free speech.

